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Abstract: In Modeling Theory in Science Education, Ibrahim Halloun (2004) adopts the word
‘paradigm’, but his use of the term is radically different from that of Kuhn. In this paper, I explore some
of the differences between Kuhn’s paradigms and Halloun’s paradigms. Where Kuhn’s paradigms are
public, community-defining exemplars of practice, Halloun’s paradigms are private, individualized ways
of thinking. Where Kuhn writes of the paradigm shift as a revolutionary, vision-altering conversion
experience, Halloun writes of a gradual evolution from one way of thinking to another and an easy backand-forth switch between paradigms. Since Kuhn’s paradigms are self-enclosed and incommensurable,
there is no objective standard by which one paradigm can be shown to be superior to the other. But
Halloun uses ‘viability’ as a standard for paradigm choice. Underlying all of this is the more basic
question of whether the history of science is an appropriate metaphor for student progress in the
classroom. I conclude with some brief thoughts on this question.

Introduction
Through two decades, ‘modeling’ has evolved as an epistemology as well as a physics pedagogy
(Arizona State University 2005; Halloun 1996a, 1998; Halloun & Hestenes 1987; Hestenes 1987,
1996; Wells, Hestenes, & Swackhamer 1995). In Modeling Theory in Science Education,
Ibrahim Halloun (2004) assembles these two decades of thought into a coherent theory. Leaning
heavily on the philosophy of Bachelard (1968/1940) as developed by Mortimer (1995) as well as
Halloun’s studies of the personal epistemologies of physics students (Halloun 1996b; Halloun &
Hestenes 1998), Halloun suggests that with respect to scientific thinking, the human mind can be
represented by three types of paradigms. The first of these is the naïve realist paradigm (NR),
characterized by a reliance on sense experience and straightforward measurements. A naïve
realist will tend to take a strictly inductive, Baconian view of scientific knowledge. For example,
a naïve realist will regard mass as little more than an observed or measured quantity. The second
type of paradigm is classical scientific realism (CR), characterized by the use of theoretical
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constructs. A classical realist will take a more deductive approach to scientific knowledge. For
example, a classical rationalist may treat mass as a ratio between two other constructs, force and
acceleration. The third type of paradigm is modern scientific realism (MR), characterized by the
insights of relativity and quantum theory. Concepts such as space and time are no longer
absolute, and classical causality is replaced with the probabilistic world of quantum physics. To
a modern scientific realist, mass depends on speed and other factors.
Halloun does not claim that anyone is a ‘pure’ naïve realist, classical realist, or modern
realist. Instead, consistent with Bachelard, Mortimer, and his own surveys of students
(Bachelard 1968/1940; Halloun 1996b; Halloun & Hestenes 1998; Mortimer 1995), Halloun
suggests that each person combines various paradigms into a unique profile. Following
Bachelard and Mortimer, Halloun illustrates this concept as follows:

CR

NR
CR
CR

NR

MR

CR
NR
MR

Naïve profile

Common sense profiles

NR

Author profile

Figure 3.2. Paradigmatic profiles
Bars are not to scale in the above bar charts, and bars’ relative heights reflect an ordinal and not a
proportional order of magnitude.
My own natural paradigmatic profile is currently dominated more by classical scientific realism (CR)
than by modern scientific realism (MR) because my professional experience has so far been concerned
more with CR than MR. The naïve realism (NR) dimension is mostly about physical realities that are
the object of scientific fields outside my domain of expertise, and which I casually contemplate.
(Halloun 2004, p. 97)
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As one progresses in science, NR paradigms are applied less frequently and in fewer domains,
while the CR and MR paradigms are applied more frequently and in a greater number of
domains. Note that in the caption to Figure 3.2 (above), Halloun explains his own incomplete
suppression of NR paradigms as the result of his incomplete experience in science. Therefore by
Halloun’s account, a complete experience of all domains of science would eliminate his NR
paradigms. This is one of several significant departures from the Bachelard/Mortimer account,
in which naïve realism would persist for a different reason:
No one can survive without common sense. Even a professional scientist uses phrases such as
‘shut the door and keep the cold out’. There is evidence to show that physicists use naïve notions
to make predictions in everyday life (McDermott 1984) . . . . This way of viewing the world is
largely incorporated as a cultural feature of everyday life. A person can acquire the capacity to
criticize its meaning in the light of more sophisticated ways of thinking. However, to suppress
the alternative conceptions sometimes means suppressing common-sense thought and its mode of
expression, everyday language, which is the most comprehensive way of sharing meaning in a
culture and permits communication between all the various specialized groups that share the same
mother tongue. To suppress it means suppressing the possibility of different groups sharing
meaning within the same culture. (Mortimer 1995, p. 276)

For Mortimer, naïve realism is built into our language and is therefore inescapable, whereas for
Halloun, NR paradigms persist because of incomplete experience. Halloun modifies the
Bachelard/Mortimer account in other ways as well. He reduces Bachelard/Mortimer’s number of
categories from five to three, and he renames each type of paradigm as a ‘realism’ instead of
Bachelard’s ‘realism’, ‘empiricism’, and ‘rationalism’; or Mortimer’s ‘concretism’,
‘empiricism’, ‘rationalism’, and ‘idealism’. Perhaps most significantly, Bachelard and
Mortimer do not refer to ‘paradigms’ at all, but ‘ways of thinking’. The use of the word
‘paradigm’ in the context of a personal epistemology is Halloun’s invention. As we will see, this
use of the word represents a significant departure from that of Thomas Kuhn.
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Personal Paradigms
Although the use of the word ‘paradigm’ in philosophy of science can be traced to Georg
Christoph Lichtenberg of the late 18th century and Ludwig Wittgenstein of the early 20th century
(Cedarbaum 1983), the present popularity of the term originates in Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For Kuhn, paradigms are exemplars of scientific practice:
I take [paradigms] to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. (p. viii)
By choosing [paradigms], I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of scientific
practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation
together—provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.
(p. 10)

In Kuhn’s use of the term, a paradigm is a model of scientific practice. This model is shared and
accepted by a community of scientists, and the model defines the community. Those who accept
the paradigm can be part of the community, and those who reject the paradigm cannot.
Therefore a paradigm is a public entity. There are no private paradigms any more than there are
private languages.
Although a paradigm is public, it has private consequences. By Kuhn’s account,
acceptance or rejection of the paradigm determines how scientists see the world. For example,
he writes that Aristotle did not see pendulums, whereas Galileo and the medieval scholastic
Oresme did:
To the Aristotelians, who believed that a heavy body is moved by its own nature from a higher
position to a state of natural rest at a lower one, the swinging body was simply falling with
difficulty. Constrained by the chain, it could achieve rest at its low point only after tortuous
motion and a considerable time. Galileo, on the other hand, looking at the swinging body, saw a
pendulum, a body that almost succeeded in repeating the same motion over and over again ad
infinitum . . . At least in Oresme’s case, and almost certainly in Galileo’s as well, it was a view
made possible by the transition from the original Aristotelian to the scholastic impetus paradigm
for motion. Until that scholastic paradigm was invented, there were no pendulums, but only
swinging stones, for the scientist to see. Pendulums were brought into existence by something
very like a paradigm-induced gestalt switch. (Kuhn 1970, pp. 118-120)
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By Kuhn’s account, the impetus paradigm brought pendulums into existence. Kuhn goes so far
as to say that ‘though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist
afterward works in a different world’ (p. 121). Yet we must avoid a temptation here—although a
paradigm profoundly affects the work and the private thought life of the scientist, the paradigm
remains a public entity. Although I may speak to myself, the language with which I speak to
myself remains public (Ryle 1949/1984, p. 27). In the same way, I may view the world through
a specific scientific paradigm, but the paradigm is meaningful only as it is shared with others.
Like languages, paradigms are community property.
Yet Halloun describes paradigms as private, individual affairs:
No two people can ever share exactly the same paradigm, whatever the nature of the paradigm or
the profession that the two people might have in common, and this, because of biological and
cultural differences in people’s history. For paradigms of a particular nature, differences are
significantly more pronounced within the lay community than within a professional community
guided by such paradigms. . . . In fact, a scientific paradigm may be delimited in a specific field
in such a way that we can practically ignore paradigmatic differences among scientists working in
this field, and say that all those scientists share virtually the same paradigm. (Halloun 2004, pp.
14-15)

Halloun places the paradigm within the person, so like fingerprints or DNA, no two paradigms
can be exactly alike. Under this trait-like account of paradigms, we can group people according
to the similarity of their paradigms. The personal paradigms of scientific communities are
notable because they are ‘virtually the same’. Presumably we could determine whether or not a
scientist was a Newtonian by estimating his or her degree of Newton-ness along a continuous
Newtonian scale.
Halloun’s concept of the paradigm contrasts sharply with the Kuhnian paradigm. As
noted above, a Kuhnian paradigm is an exemplar, a theoretical or experimental model which
guides the practice of individual scientists. Since this exemplar is a specific event or practice, it
lies outside of the individual. Therefore under Kuhn’s theory, there are no degrees of Newton5

ness. Either one accepts and works under the Netwonian paradigm or one does not. In this
regard, Kuhn’s is a quantum epistemology. Halloun has moved the paradigm from an exemplar
outside the individual to a trait within the individual; he has broken a single paradigm shared by
many scientists into many personal paradigms which overlap to varying degrees; and he has
changed membership in a scientific community from a question of participation to a comparison
of degrees of similarity along a continuum. In short, he has inverted, atomized, and de-quantized
the Kuhnian concept of paradigm.

Paradigmatic Evolution
Among the crucial (and controversial) concepts in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is the
incommensurability of paradigms:
[T]he proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One contains
constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other pendulums that repeat their motions again and again
. . . Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look
from the same point in the same direction. (Kuhn 1970, p. 150)

Because the two groups of scientists practice in different worlds, they cannot perceive the world
in the same way, and therefore they are unable to communicate fully with each other:
‘[c]ommunication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably partial’ (p. 149). Consequently,
compromise is impossible. When someone switches from one camp to another, it is like entering
a new world:
[Paradigmatic crises] are terminated, not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively
sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch. Scientists then often speak of the “scales
falling from the eyes” or of the “lightning flash” than “inundates” a previously obscured puzzle,
enabling its components to be seen in a new way that for the first time permits its solution.
(Kuhn 1970, p. 122)
Like a gestalt switch, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all.
(p. 150)

The scientist experiences a gestalt switch, a sudden and complete paradigm shift. Although it
may occur over time, it isn’t a gradual change; it is a scientific revolution. Yet Sharrock and
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Read (2002) point out an important limitation to Kuhn’s gestalt switch metaphor. In the classic
gestalt images, one’s perception can switch back and forth between a duck and a rabbit or an old
woman and a young woman. Yet by Kuhn’s account, scientific revolutions are one-way—once
the scientist has switched paradigms, there is no going back to the old way of seeing (Sharrock &
Read 2002, pp. 45-46).
However, Halloun’s inversion/personalization of the paradigm concept enables
incommensurable paradigms to peacefully coexist within the same person. For Halloun, a
student’s scientific maturation is not characterized by an apprenticeship into a community of
practice, but in learning to employ different paradigms in different situations:
A physicist may use a Newtonian model (CR-type . . .) to study a typical transition . . ., and then
shift to a relativistic model ([MR]) to study the same transition or a similar one, should s/he desire
to significantly improve the precision of the outcomes. In contrast, paradigmatic profiles of
ordinary people, science students included, do not have their scopes and limits of viability well
delineated, and various paradigms often overlap in conflicting ways. A student might have
recourse to a particular model with one particular instance of a given pattern (say, a positivist,
[NR] model . . .), and then a contradictory model (say, a Newtonian, CR one) with another
instance of the same pattern considered under the same rational and empirical conditions as
before. (Halloun 2004, p. 95)

By atomizing and personalizing paradigms, Halloun has reduced the vision-altering, communitydefining character of the Kuhnian paradigm to a matter of choosing the appropriate paradigm for
the situation at hand. Instead of a crisis over how scientists see the world, we have an
epistemological supermarket. The one-way gestalt switch, the ‘conversion experience’ (Kuhn
1970, p. 151) of the Kuhnian revolution is replaced by a regular and perhaps easy back-and-forth
switch from paradigm to paradigm.
From a Kuhnian perspective, the novice student described above would be preparadigmatic, participating in no paradigm at all, and education would be a matter of initiating
the student into a paradigm. But Halloun’s wholesale change of the paradigm concept enables
him to describe the education process not as a matter of paradigmatic initiation, but as a matter of
7

transformation from a naïve paradigm to a scientific paradigm. This transformation is not a
matter of revolution for Halloun, but a matter of paradigmatic evolution:
Paradigmatic evolution involves the transformation of existing constituents of a person’s initial
paradigmatic profile, as well as formation of new paradigmatic constituents. Transformation
extends from the refinement to the rejection and replacement of existing conceptual structures
and processes. (Halloun 2004, p. 113, emphasis original)

A Kuhnian paradigm may develop over time, but it doesn’t evolve into a new paradigm. Instead,
the pressure of anomalies builds within the paradigm until a paradigm shift occurs. It is a
discontinuous process. By contrast, Halloun’s personal paradigms can gradually evolve from
one to another. As an educator, one hopes that the student will eventually choose scientific
paradigms more often than naïve paradigms:
[T]eachers can only hope that in any conceptual profile possessed by individual students some but
not all of its naïve components become modified. Thus, one can never expect an integral
paradigm shift, from naïve to scientific realism, but only a partial, though significant, change of
the paradigmatic or conceptual profile in the positive direction. (Halloun 2004, p. 130)

Whereas Kuhn is a catastrophist, speaking of a sudden shift in perspective, Halloun is a
gradualist, speaking of a slow transition from domination by naïve paradigms to domination by
scientific paradigms.

Viability
A consequence of the incommensurability of Kuhnian paradigms is that there exists no external
standard by which one can compare one paradigm to another. A paradigm is a self-enclosed
system, setting the standard for appropriate questions as well as satisfactory answers:
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms
proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that
character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures
characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that
paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice,
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s
defense.
The resulting circularity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or ineffectual. The man
who premises a paradigm when arguing its defense can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of
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what scientific practice will be like for those who adopt the new view of nature. That exhibit can
be immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet, whatever its force, the status of the circular
argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically
compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle. (Kuhn 1970, p. 94)

Since practitioners of competing paradigms reason from within the paradigm, the competing
paradigms stand on equal footing. Each paradigm is equally able to answer its own questions.
Therefore paradigm choice is not a matter of evidence, but a matter of persuasion.
As mentioned above, a novice does not participate in a Kuhnian paradigm, but is rather
pre-paradigmatic. Although Halloun acknowledges that the novice’s thoughts are neither
systematic nor self-consistent (e. g. p. 118), his individualization of the paradigm concept
enables him to elevate the novice’s untutored thoughts to the status of paradigm. Consequently,
Halloun deals with education as a matter of paradigm shift (or more accurately paradigm
evolution) rather than paradigm initiation. In doing so, he deals with NR ‘paradigms’ in a
decidedly non-Kuhnian way:
[S]tudent conceptions about physical realities consist more of mixed beliefs and knowledge of
vague correspondence to the real world than of viable knowledge about physical realities.
(Halloun 2004, p. 89, emphasis added)

And,
[M]ost of what students think they know about the course actually consists of mixed beliefs,
naïve or viable, about science and to a lesser extent about physical realities. The relative amount
of knowledge and the proportion of naïve knowledge to viable knowledge vary from course to
course, and from one student to another in a given course. (Halloun 2004, p. 116, emphasis
added)

For Halloun, CR and MR paradigms are viable, whereas NR paradigms are not viable. In
making such statements, Halloun is forgetting or disregarding the self-enclosed, circular nature
of the Kuhnian paradigm. If we insist on describing novice beliefs as paradigms, then the
viability of those beliefs should not be in question. They work very well within the everyday
world of the student. If an outfielder wishes to catch a fly ball, an everyday, naïve way of
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thinking will be more useful than a CR or MR paradigm. Halloun forgets that when he
demonstrates to the student that her naïve conceptions are not viable, he also introduces new
standards for viability. The scientific paradigm provides the new questions as well as the new
answers.

The Adaptability of the Paradigm Concept
Now that I have pointed out that Halloun and Kuhn use the word ‘paradigm’ in radically
different ways, Halloun or anyone else might very well respond with a shrug. After all, language
constantly evolves (McWhorter, 2002), so an evolution of the word ‘paradigm’ is to be expected.
Citing Margaret Masterman (1970), Halloun points out (Halloun 2004, p. 15) that ‘paradigm’
was never well defined in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Critics such as Kenneth
Caneva (2000) and Michael Matthews (2004) have criticized Kuhn for imprecision in key issues
cited above, such as Kuhn’s failure to adequately account for the relationship between the
individual scientist and the community and his failure to explain how a gestalt switch can occur
over an extended period of time. Kuhn has many critics (see, e. g., Lakatos & Musgrave 1970).
Perhaps Halloun has simply taken a flawed paradigm concept and transformed it into a useful
one.
In response, I would begin by noting the necessity of precision in scholarly work. If
Halloun’s use of ‘paradigm’ differs from the conventional use of the term, he should point this
out. Early in Modeling Theory in Science Education, Halloun makes an effort to do so:
Our position regarding paradigms, and especially scientific paradigms, converges in part with
Kuhn’s position. We do not fully subscribe to Kuhn’s work (1970), or any other work in the
philosophy of science for that matter . . . (Halloun, 2004, p. 16)

Yet following this disclaimer, Halloun lays out an essentially Kuhnian definition of ‘paradigm’,
beginning with: “We thus define a scientific paradigm as a natural paradigm shared by members
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of a particular scientific community, of well-defined scope in the real world, and consisting of . .
.’ (p. 16, emphasis original). Here and in the extensive definition that follows, we see no hint of
the inverted, atomized, gradualist use of the term that characterizes Halloun’s subsequent use of
the term. Furthermore, Halloun cites Kuhn nearly 20 times throughout the book, including at
least 9 quotations. Apparently, Halloun is unconscious of his extensive redefinition of the term.
Halloun notes that Masterman (1970) lists 21 uses of the word ‘paradigm’. Yet
Masterman’s point isn’t that the word is ‘up for grabs’: ‘It is evident that not all of these senses
of “paradigm” are inconsistent with one another: some may even be elucidations of others’
(Masterman 1970, p. 65). As I read the list, it appears to me to be a list of metaphors in the
development and explication of the paradigm idea rather than a list of conflicting definitions. To
borrow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s phrase, Kuhn’s various uses of ‘paradigm’ bear a close family
resemblance. Masterman concludes, and many philosophers would agree, that the concept of
paradigm is crude. Yet Masterman counts the ‘crudeness’ of the paradigm concept as a strength
rather than a weakness! She asserts that if it were defined too precisely, it would no longer be a
useful concept (pp. 79-81). Although the concept is crude, Masterman would agree that it is not
without boundaries. However, Halloun’s use of the word falls outside of Kuhn’s boundaries.

Conclusion: Historical vs. Cognitive Development
Halloun looks to Kuhn for guidance because he assumes that the historical development of the
sciences bears some relationship to the learning of science by individual students:
[W]e believe that Kuhn’s account of the development of scientific paradigms provides significant
insights not only into those paradigms, but also into the natural paradigms of science students. In
this respect, the cognitive implications of Kuhn’s work bear for us a special value . . . (Halloun
2004, p. 16)

Piaget (1970) championed the idea that the development of individual students recapitulates
historical development, and the idea plays an important role in conceptual change theory as well
11

(see, e. g., Hewson 1981; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog 1982). However, I have come to
doubt that ‘cognitive ontogeny recapitulates scientific phylogeny’ (Matthews, 1994, p. 208).
For example, Aristotle’s beliefs about falling objects and the impetus theories of the medieval
scholastics are sometimes cited in support of the thesis. Yet Aristotle and the medieval
scholastics were highly systematic thinkers who strived for self-consistency. By contrast,
Halloun points out that novice thinking is often ad hoc and inconsistent (e. g. p. 118). How are
ancient natural philosophers comparable to novices? Or as other critics have noted:
The naïve astronomical theories of students are certainly not so complex and observationally
accurate as the Ptolemaic theories that Copernicus confronted. And the current naïve
astronomical theories certainly do not include assumptions about the immutability of the heavens
or the existence of crystalline spheres surrounding the earth. Thus, a case by case study needs to
be made of the dominant naïve theories in various domains . . . (Duschl, Hamilton, & Grandy
1992, p. 40)

Again, how are ancient experts, steeped as they were in a particular paradigm, comparable to
modern pre-paradigmatic novices? Like many others before him, Halloun assumes that history is
an appropriate metaphor for cognitive development. Soon the personal paradigm becomes an
appropriate metaphor for the workings of the human mind. The Kuhnian paradigm, however,
does not lie within the student. Therefore the Kuhnian paradigm is an inappropriate metaphor
for the working of the human mind.
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